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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3827 
___________ 
 
MACK TRUCKS INC., 
          Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BORGWARNER TURBO SYSTEMS, INC. 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-02621 
(Honorable Harvey Bartle III) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 10, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 21, 2012) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiff Mack Truck, Inc. (“Mack”) appeals the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Defendant BorgWarner Turbo Systems, Inc. (“BorgWarner”) on 
Mack‟s breach of express warranty and breach of contract claims due to alleged design 
defects.  We will affirm.    
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I. 
Mack and BorgWarner entered into a “Supply Agreement,” dated December 6, 
2002, in which BorgWarner agreed to manufacture and supply turbochargers for use in 
Mack‟s truck engines.  Section 9(b) of the Supply Agreement provides: 
BorgWarner‟s warranties to Mack regarding the Products are set forth in 
Annex V, attached hereto and incorporated herein.  Notwithstanding 
anything else in this Agreement or the Annexes to the contrary, 
BorgWarner warrants that the Products shall, for the period of time defined 
in Annex V from the date placed in to service, be of good material and 
workmanship and shall conform to the specifications agreed upon by the 
parties . . . . 
 
J.A. vol. II, A78-79.
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On July 8, 2003, the parties added Annex V to the Supply Agreement.  Annex V is 
titled the “Product Warranty Terms and Conditions.”  Id. at A103.  Paragraph F of Annex 
V states, “BorgWarner shall only warrant products that have a signed application sheet 
and that do not exceed their limits while in operation in the field.”  Id.  The parties agree 
the “signed application sheet” refers to a document also called the “Product Application 
Agreement” (“PAA”). 
                                              
1
 Annex V, paragraph A repeats these warranties, stating “Borg Warner warrants to Mack 
(with the exceptions noted in Annex VII [sic], that the Products will conform to the 
specifications provided to Borg Warner by Mack, and to any other technical requirements 
agreed upon by the parties. Borg Warner also warrants to Mack that the Products will be 
free of defects in material and workmanship in normal use and service.”  J.A. vol. II, 
A103.  It conspicuously disclaims all other warranties, including the implied warranties 
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.  Id. 
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 The parties had already entered into a “Conditionally Approved” PAA, dated 
October 31, 2002, memorializing the specifications for a “pilot” line of turbochargers.2  
Id. at A172-78.  After executing the Supply Agreement, the parties attempted to negotiate 
a second non-conditional PAA that would establish specifications for turbochargers under 
the Supply Agreement.  Negotiations lasted into 2004, but the parties never reached an 
agreement. 
During and after these negotiations, BorgWarner continued to provide Mack with 
turbochargers for its truck engines pursuant to the Supply Agreement.  But BorgWarner 
expressed to Mack its position that unless they both agreed on and signed a second PAA, 
Mack would have no design warranty coverage on the turbochargers.  BorgWarner made 
clear Mack would still have warranty coverage for material and workmanship.  Mack did 
not expressly assent to this understanding of the warranties, but Mack‟s internal emails 
demonstrate Mack was aware BorgWarner did not intend to provide warranty coverage 
unless a second PAA was signed.   
Once the turbochargers reached Mack‟s consumers, they began to fail at high 
rates.  Mack ultimately paid over $45 million to its customers from warranty claims 
brought through August of 2008.  BorgWarner reviewed the customer claims, provided 
Mack with monthly summaries documenting the “condition codes” under which 
                                              
2
 Because Mack was designing the engines in which BorgWarner‟s turbochargers were a 
component, Mack and BorgWarner had to agree to certain “specifications,” such as the 
maximum oil supply temperature and the maximum allowable shaft speed, which 
describe the environmental limitations within which the turbochargers would operate.   
4 
 
BorgWarner categorized each claim, and ultimately reimbursed Mack for nearly $4.5 
million of these claims.
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Mack brought suit against BorgWarner for breach of contract and breach of 
warranty for failing to reimburse the remaining portion of claim payments allegedly due 
to BorgWarner‟s design defects.  The District Court found BorgWarner had made two 
express warranties to Mack.  First, a specifications warranty covering the design of the 
turbochargers.  Second, a material and workmanship warranty covering “deficiencies in 
the execution of the design.”  Mack Trucks, Inc. v. BorgWarner Turbo Sys., Inc., No. 08-
2621, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29680, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2011).  The District Court 
held the signed application sheet, or PAA, was an unambiguous condition precedent to 
warranty coverage by BorgWarner.  The court found BorgWarner waived the condition 
precedent with respect to material and workmanship claims, but not with respect to 
design claims.  Since Mack and BorgWarner never agreed on a second PAA, the design 
warranty never became effective.  Therefore, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for BorgWarner with respect to Mack‟s breach of express warranty and breach 
of contract claims for alleged design defects.   
The District Court also denied Mack‟s motion for reconsideration.  Mack asserted 
the District Court had failed to consider the Lewis declaration as evidence BorgWarner 
intentionally hindered negotiations of the second PAA to avoid warranty liability.  The 
District Court rejected this argument, stating the Lewis declaration did not show 
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 Mack has added additional claims from September of 2008 through February of 2010 as 
a supplement. 
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“BorgWarner abused a power to specify terms or negotiated with Mack in bad faith.”  
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. BorgWarner Turbo Sys., Inc., No. 08-2621, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
49132, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2011).   
II.
4
 
  For purposes of this appeal, we assume the turbochargers supplied by 
BorgWarner failed because of design defects.  Mack asserts the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment to BorgWarner because the material and workmanship 
warranty—for which BorgWarner has agreed to reimburse claims—includes design 
defects, or, in the alternative, because the contract is ambiguous and should be interpreted 
with the benefit of a complete record.  In addition, Mack contends BorgWarner waived 
any purported condition precedent of a signed PAA by paying on customers‟ warranty 
claims and by negotiating the second PAA in a bad faith attempt to avoid warranty 
liability.  
A. 
 Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law to be decided by the court.   
Allegheny Int’l, Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 40 F.3d 1416, 1424 (3d Cir. 1994) 
                                              
4
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as this is an appeal from final judgment.  “[O]ur 
review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary.”  Koshatka v. Philadelphia 
Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985).  We must determine if the movant 
has shown “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  It should be noted that although 
the language of Rule 56 was amended after the filing of this case, “[t]he standard for 
granting summary judgment remains unchanged.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) advisory 
committee notes.  The parties agree Pennsylvania law governs the interpretation of this 
contract.   
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(applying Pennsylvania law).  “To decide whether a contract is ambiguous, . . . we „hear 
the proffer of the parties and determine if there [are] objective indicia that, from the 
linguistic reference point of the parties, the terms of the contract are susceptible of 
different meanings.‟”  Teamsters Indus. Emps. Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, 
Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Sheet Metal 
Workers, Local 19 v. 2300 Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1284 (3d Cir. 1991)).  We look to 
“the contract language, the meanings suggested by counsel, and the extrinsic evidence 
offered in support of each interpretation.  Extrinsic evidence may include the structure of 
the contract, the bargaining history, and the conduct of the parties that reflects their 
understanding of the contract‟s meaning.”  Id. (citations omitted).  An unambiguous 
contract may be construed by the court as a matter of law, including on motion for 
summary judgment, whereas an ambiguous contract must be interpreted by the factfinder.  
Allegheny, 40 F.3d at 1424.   
Certain rules of construction guide our analysis of the contract.  The Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania has defined a condition precedent in a contract as “an event, not 
certain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before 
performance under a contract becomes due.”  Shovel Transfer & Storage, Inc. v. Pa. 
Liquor Control Bd., 739 A.2d 133, 139 (Pa. 1999) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 224).  We may not construe a contract provision as a condition precedent to 
performance “unless that clearly appears to be the intention of the parties.”  Id.  In 
addition, with respect to warranty language in particular, the UCC provides, “[w]ords or 
conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to 
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negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each 
other . . . .”  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2316(a).   
Applying these principles to the present case, we agree with the District Court that 
the Supply Agreement is unambiguous and that paragraph F of Annex V is a condition 
precedent to BorgWarner‟s warranties.  Section 9(b) of the Supply Agreement first 
directs the reader to Annex V for an explanation of BorgWarner‟s warranties, which 
clearly states BorgWarner will “only” warrant turbochargers “that have a signed 
application sheet and that do not exceed their limits while in operation in the field.”  J.A. 
vol. II, A103.  Section 9(b) then goes on to provide that “[n]otwithstanding” anything in 
the contract and Annexes to the contrary, BorgWarner will offer two warranties—the 
turbochargers will (1) be of good material and workmanship, and (2) conform to the 
specifications agreed upon by the parties.  Id. at A78.  In context, the “notwithstanding” 
clause merely promises two kinds of warranty protection, subject to the earlier-
incorporated condition precedent requiring the turbochargers to have a signed application 
sheet (PAA).  Importantly, this reading of the contract harmonizes paragraph F of Annex 
V with the “notwithstanding” clause of Section 9(b), ensuring neither is rendered 
superfluous. 
B. 
It is not disputed that BorgWarner waived the PAA condition with respect to its 
material and workmanship warranty, explaining to Mack on several occasions that even 
without a signed PAA, BorgWarner would warrant its turbochargers for defects in 
material and workmanship.  Mack contends BorgWarner should reimburse claims 
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allegedly caused by design defects because these claims fall within the scope of the 
material and workmanship warranty.   
We may not rewrite the parties‟ contract for them or “give it a construction in 
conflict with . . . the accepted and plain meaning of the language used.”  Amoco Oil Co. 
v. Snyder, 478 A.2d 795, 798 (Pa. 1984) (quoting Hagarty v. William Akers, Jr. Co., 20 
A.2d 317, 319 (Pa. 1941)).  BorgWarner promised its products would “be of good 
material and workmanship.”  J.A. vol. II, A78.  The parties did not define “material” or 
“workmanship” in their contract.  Nor has the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania construed 
these terms in the context of warranties.  Mack does not offer any Pennsylvania case law 
or evidence of the parties‟ intent to support the proposition that a material and 
workmanship warranty includes a warranty for the product‟s design.  And Mack stretches 
the ordinary definition of “workmanship” by trying to fit “design” within it.  Webster‟s 
Dictionary defines “workmanship” as “the art or skill of a workman,” or “the execution 
or manner of making or doing something.”  Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary Unabridged 2635 (1961).  A “workman,” or “workingman,” is defined as 
“one who works for wages usually at manual labor.”  Id.  As made clear by its focus on 
the “manual” “execution” of a product, the definition of “workmanship” presupposes that 
the product being made or assembled has already been designed.  Design is an earlier and 
distinct phase of product production not captured by the workmanship warranty.   
Moreover, the parties‟ course of performance makes clear the specifications 
warranty—not the material and workmanship warranty—was intended to cover design 
defects.  In Pennsylvania, “course of performance is always relevant in interpreting a 
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writing.”  Atl. Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736, 741 n.6 (Pa. 1978).  “A course of 
performance . . . between the parties . . . is relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the 
parties‟ agreement, may give particular meaning to specific terms of the agreement and 
may supplement or qualify the terms of the agreement.”  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1303(d).  
And “the express terms of an agreement and any applicable course of performance . . . 
must be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other.”  Id. § 1303(e).   
BorgWarner made clear to Mack representatives the material and workmanship 
warranty did not cover design defects.  See J.A. vol. II, A192 (“Per our supply agreement, 
we do not grant design warranty on the 5176M series until the PAA is signed.  However, 
I would like to make it clear that regardless of a supply agreement, all of our products are 
always warrantied for quality of manufacture, i.e. defects in materials and/or assembly.”).  
And Mack repeatedly acknowledged internally it would not receive warranty coverage 
until a PAA was signed, belying its assertion now that design defects are covered by the 
material and workmanship warranty that BorgWarner repeatedly assured Mack applied 
regardless of a signed PAA.   
The plain meaning of the “material and workmanship” warranty, in conjunction 
with the parties‟ course of performance, make clear the design warranty was captured by 
BorgWarner‟s promise the turbochargers would “conform to the specifications agreed 
upon by the parties” and not by its promise the turbochargers would “be of good material 
and workmanship.”  Since the parties never agreed on the specifications for turbochargers 
under the Supply Agreement, the specifications or design warranty never became 
effective. 
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C. 
Mack contends BorgWarner waived the PAA condition precedent to the design 
warranty by paying on some warranty claims.  “To constitute a waiver of legal right, 
there must be a clear, unequivocal and decisive act of the party with knowledge of such 
right and an evident purpose to surrender it . . . .  It may be expressed or implied.”  Brown 
v. City of Pittsburgh, 409 Pa. 357, 360 (1962) (citations omitted); see also Paramount 
Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 148 (3d Cir. 1999).  “[A] course of performance 
is relevant to show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with the course of 
performance.”  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1303(f). 
BorgWarner‟s payment on some warranty claims does not prove waiver of the 
PAA condition precedent to the design warranty because Mack failed to show 
BorgWarner‟s payments were made on design claims and not on the material and 
workmanship claims that BorgWarner had indisputably agreed to pay.  Additionally, 
BorgWarner never wavered in its communications with Mack—BorgWarner consistently 
stated it would not provide design warranty coverage until a PAA between the parties 
was signed.  Since there was no evidence of a clear and unequivocal act of waiver, Mack 
did not raise a genuine issue of material fact that BorgWarner waived the PAA condition 
precedent to the design warranty. 
D. 
Mack also contends BorgWarner waived the PAA condition precedent to the 
design warranty by failing to negotiate the terms of the second PAA in good faith and by 
failing to offer commercially reasonable terms.  Mack contends the specifications agreed 
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to by the parties in the conditional PAA were fixed and BorgWarner acted in bad faith by 
deviating from those specifications and adding warranty language in its proposals for a 
second PAA. 
Every contract in Pennsylvania includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  Benchmark Gr., Inc. v. Penn Tank Lines, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 2d 562, 583 (E.D. 
Pa. 2009).  Pursuant to this principle, “a party to a contract cannot escape liability under 
his obligation on the ground that the other party has failed to perform a condition 
precedent to the establishment of such liability or to the maintenance of an action upon 
the contract, where he himself has caused that failure.”  Shovel Transfer & Storage, Inc., 
739 A.2d at 140 (quoting Commonwealth v. Transam. Ins. Co., 341 A.2d 74, 77 (Pa. 
1975)).  Similarly, the UCC states a party with the power to specify the particulars of 
performance must do so “in good faith and within limits set by commercial 
reasonableness.”  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2311(a).  “[E]xamples of „bad faith‟ conduct 
include: „evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful 
rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference 
with or failure to cooperate in the other party‟s performance.‟”  Kaplan v. Cablevision of 
PA, Inc., 671 A.2d 716, 722 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (quoting Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 
1211, 1213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)). 
The evidence put forth by Mack, including the Lewis declaration, did not raise a 
genuine dispute that BorgWarner acted in bad faith during negotiations for the second 
PAA.  We agree with the District Court that the evidence “shows only that BorgWarner 
offered to warranty turbochargers with operating limits that Mack considered 
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unacceptable in light of the investment it had already made in its engine design.”  Mack 
Trucks, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49132, at *3.   
Mack offers no evidence to suggest the parties agreed to fix the specifications in 
the conditional PAA for the duration of the Supply Agreement.  Evidence in the record 
actually suggests the contrary—that because of time constraints imposed by Mack, 
various warranty and specification provisions were unsettled at the time the parties signed 
the conditional PAA.  Mack‟s evidence—including the Lewis declaration and the July 22, 
2004 Roth email—showed only that BorgWarner was willing to sign a PAA with 
specification and warranty provisions Mack found unfavorable.  This evidence supports 
an inference of poor planning and coordination between the parties but does not support 
an inference that BorgWarner acted in bad faith or in a commercially unreasonable 
manner.  Mack did not raise a genuine issue of material fact that BorgWarner acted in 
bad faith or in a commercially unreasonable manner. 
III. 
We will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
BorgWarner on Mack‟s breach of contract and breach of warranty claims for alleged 
design defects.   
